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COMMENTS
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN MISSOURI
I. THE RULE IN GENERAL
Having deliberately put their engagements into writing, in such terms
as import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object or
extent of the engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole en-
gagement of the parties and the extent and manner of their undertaking,
have been reduced to writing, and parol evidence is not permitted to vary,
or contradict the terms of such writing, or to substitute a new or different
contract for it.,
This comprehensive statement of the parol evidence rule is one of the first
adopted,2 and the most consistently used by Missouri appellate courts.3 The
principle which it states is that when men make a written memorial expressing
their contract, it is regarded as the only evidence of that agreement and the most
trustworthy testimony of what they have transacted. Therefore, the written con-
tract is conclusively presumed to contain all prior negotiations and to express the
final agreement.4 Were this not so, when sued on a contract a party could admit
that he signed it, but deny that it expressed the agreement he made; or admit
that he signed, but deny that he read it or knew of its stipulations. This would
greatly impair the value of all written contracts and negotiable instruments for
there could be little reliance upon them to substantiate one's rights. The consistent
application of this rule also removes the temptation and possibility of perjury
which would exist if parol evidence were admissible.5 The Missouri Supreme Court
has expressed the rationale of the parol evidence rule as follows:
The general rule excluding evidence of contemporaneous or prior verbal
agreements, varying or contradicting the terms of a valid written instru-
ment, is an outgrowth of the common experience of men .... It rests on
principles somewhat analogous to those which underlie the conclusiveness
of judgments upon the parties thereto. It is said to be the interest of the
state that there should be an end to litigation. Accordingly, the record that
closes a forensic controversy is regarded as merging the matters litigated
to the extent declared in the judgment. So, in private adjustments of re-
ciprocal rights, it is wisely considered that, when parties have deliberately
1. 10 R.C.L. Evidence § 209 (1916).
2. Laclede Constr. Co. v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25, 84 S.W. 76 (1904).
3. Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W.2d 817 (1950);
Employer's Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 38 S.W.2d 1049 (1931); Davison
v. Rodes, 299 S.W.2d 591 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956); Sol Abrahams & Sons Constr.
Co. v. Osterholm, 136 S.W.2d 86 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940). For other statements
of the rule commonly used, see Hudler v. Muller, 55 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. 1932);
State ex rel. Morrison Inv. Co. v. Trimble, 301 Mo. 146, 256 S.W. 171 (1923);
Greaves v. Huber, 235 S.W.2d 86 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932); Rigler v. Reid, 186 Mo.
App. 111, 171 S.W. 952 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
4. Poe v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 339 Mo. 1025, 99 S.W.2d 89 (1936); Rollins
v. Claybrook, 22 Mo. 405 (1856); Greaves v. Huber, supra note 3.
5. Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 554, 63 S.W. 489 (1901) (en banc).
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put their mutual agreements into the form of a completed written contract,
that expression of their intention should -be accepted as a finality, in which
is merged all prior negotiations within the scope of the writing.6
-The parol evidence rule became a part of the common law with the transition
from impressive public ceremonies such as livery of seisen, to the common use of
written instruments to record everyday transactions.7 Its purpose being to preserve
the sanctity of written contracts, it is not a rule of evidence dealing with the
probative trustworthiness of particular data. On the contrary, it is a rule of sub-
stantive law operating to limit evidence from which interpretive inferences may be
drawn and to define the limits of the contract.8 It is a blanket exclusion of any
evidence, written or oral, tending to alter, vary or contradict the terms of a valid
written contract. In other words, parol evidence is no evidence at all. Thus, a
litigant who bases his suit entirely on a matter inhibited by the parol evidence
rule will inevitably suffer a directed verdict against him if his opponent requests
it, even though such evidence was admitted without objection.,
A list of the writings to which the parol evidence rule applies is impressive.
The touchstone of applicability is whether or not the terms of the writing import
a legal obligation. Thus, writings of a contractual nature such as deeds,10 mort-
gages,11 notes,12 powers of attorney,13 employment contracts,1 4 bills of sale,15
leases,16 judicial records,17 etc., are safeguarded by the rule. But, such writings as
ordinary receipts,18 letters, 9 memoranda,20 and common prose are not affected
by it.
6. Tracy v. Union Iron Works, 104 Mo. 193, 198, 16 S.W. 203, 204 (1891).
See also Sunderland v. Hackney Mfg. Co., 193 Mo. App. 287, 181 S.W. 1192, 1195(K.C. Ct. App. 1916), and NICHOLS, DEFuNIAK, WILLIAMS, MOORE, CLARK, POORE
& NORRIS, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 26.394 (3d ed. 1951):
The parol evidence rule is based on the doctrines of estoppel and
merger. A party who has entered into a contract evidenced by writing, or
who has executed a written instrument, cannot be heard to impair its
obligation by evidence contradicting or varying it. Matters of negotiation
antecedent to and dehors the writing are considered as being merged
into it.
7. For the history of the parol evidence rule, see 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 631 (rev. ed. 1936); 9 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2405 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1953); Commerce Trust Co.
v. Watts, supra note 3; Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d 541 (St. L. Ct. App. 1954);
Sol Abrahams & Sons Constr. Co. v. Osterholm, supra note 3.
9. Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, supra note 3.
10. Williams v. Reed, 37 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1931).
11. Stephens v. Bell, 106 S.W.2d 19 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
12. Bank of Mountain View v. Winebrenner, 355 Mo. 79, 195 S.W.2d 486
(1946) (en banc).
13. Ashley v. Bird, 1 Mo. 640 (1826).
14. Isaac T. Cook Co. v. Craddock-Terry Co., 109 S.W.2d 731 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1937).
15. Standard Foundry Co. v. Schloss, 43 Mo. App. 304 (St. L. Ct. App. 1891).
16. Hargis v. Sample, 306 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1957).
17. State ex rel. Gregory v. Henderson, 230 Mo. App. 1, 88 S.W.2d 893 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1935).
18. Wind v. Bank of Maplewood, 58 S.W.2d 332 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
[Vol. 27
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As to the persons affected by the parol evidence rule, it is invoked generally
only in suits between the parties (and their successors in interest) who made the
writing in controversy the final statement of their agreement. But strangers to the
agreement are not precluded from proving the truth, no matter how contradictory
to the writing it may be.21 Otherwise, a third person would be prejudiced by
things recited in the writing contrary to the truth through the ignorance, careless-
ness, or fraud of the parties.22 In Tomlinson v. Marshall,23 the plaintiff brought an
action based on negligence for injuries incurred in a steam laundry alleged to be
owned by the defendant. The plaintiff was allowed to introduce evidence contradict-
ing a purported written lease of the laundry by the defendant to an employee of
little means. The court said, ". . . plaintiff's rights are to be determined by what
they actually did, and not by what they said to each other in the written instrument
would be done." 2-
A party to a contract involved in litigation with a stranger to it may also
present evidence contradicting it. An example often found in Missouri cases is
where a plaintiff has signed what appears to be a release of one of several joint
19. Bagnall v. Frank Fehr Brewing Co., 203 Mo. App. 635, 221 S.W. 793
(K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
20. McGinnis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.2d 501 (Spr. Ct. App. 1934).
21. Coe v. Griggs, 76 Mo. 619 (1882); Davenport v. Murray, 68 Mo. 198(1878); McKee v. City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 184 (1852); Cantrell v. Burgess, 141
S.W.2d 200 (Spr. Ct. App. 1940); Proctor v. Home Trust Co., 221 Mo. App. 577,
284 S.W. 156 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926); Murphy v. People's Ry., 15 Mo. App.
594 (St. L. Ct. App. 1884); Cordes v. Straszer, 8 Mo. App. 61 (St. L. Ct. App.
1879).
22. Burk v. Walton, 337 Mo. 781, 86 S.W.2d 92 (1935).
23. 208 Mo. App. 381, 236 S.W. 680 (K.C. Ct. App. 1921); Hill v. Sutton,
8 Mo. App. 353 (St. L. Ct. App. 1880), where parol evidence was allowed in a
suit against one of two partners to prove that the partnership agreement was not
the partners' working arrangement.
24. Tomlinson v. Marshall, sunpra note 23, at 392, 236 S.W. at 684. Other
common situations: Party to a deed reciting assumption of indebtedness allowed
to testify he did not assume a mortgage, Wissman v. Pearline, 235 Mo. App. 314,
135 S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940); McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 20
S.W.2d 63 (1929); Nonassumption clause contradicted in Empire Trust Co. v.
Hitchcock, 233 Mo. App. 581 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939).
Parol evidence allowed in third party situation to show who the real party
to the contract was: Sauer v. Brinker, 77 Mo. 289 (1883); Berry v. Royster, 232
S.W. 477 (K.C. Ct. App. 1921); Cash v. Wysocki, 229 S.W. 428 (K.C. Ct. App.
1921); Leckie v. Bennett, 160 Mo. App. 145, 141 S.W. 706 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911);
Morgan v. Dennison & Co., 114 Mo. App. 700, 91 S.W. 1024 (K.C. Ct. App. 1905).
Parol evidence admissible in proceeding to collect attorney's fee that out-of-
court settlement included defendant's agreement to pay attorney's fees: LePure v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 156 S.W.2d 37 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941); Gerritzen v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 115 S.W.2d 44 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
Parol evidence allowed to show the relationships between parties was that of
principal and surety: In re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1947); Citizens'
Ins. Co. v. Broyles, 78 Mo. App. 364 (St. L. Ct. App. 1899); Leeper v. Paschal,
70 Mo. App. 117 (K.C. Ct. App. 1897).
1962]
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tortfeasors. The plaintiff, when suing another tortfeasor, may show that the writing
was a covenant not to sue rather than a release.25
However, when one, though not a party to an instrument, bases his claim upon
it and attempts to render it effective against one of the parties to it, the parol evi-
dence rule applies. Thus, in Schneider v. Kirkpatrick,26 a judgment creditor in an
action against the recipient of certain stocks transferred in a compromise and
settlement with the debtor was not allowed to vary the terms of the settlement.
It is not difficult to state the parol evidence rule or to explain to what and
to whom it applies. The difficulty arises in determining when it applies. A volumi-
nous number of so-called "exceptions" to the parol evidence rule have been pro-
claimed by courts and treatise writers. There are situations in which parol evidence
is admissible concerning a written instrument for certain purposes. These purposes
are classified into three categories for convenience of presentation and the ensuing
discussion will deal with each in detail. At this point, however, an advance observa-
tion is made: for no purpose in an action between the parties to a valid written
instrument is parol evidence admitted which alters, varies or contradicts the terms
of that instrument. Hence a more accurate statement is that there are no excep-
tions to the parol evidence rule.
II. PAROL EVIDENCE is ADMITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING THAT NO
VALID CoNTRAcr ExIsTs
Before the parol evidence rule may be applied, a court must initially determine
whether or not the parties before it have entered into a contract.27 Since the
existence of a contract must be established, no relevant evidence is excluded on the
issue, either on behalf of the proponent of the contract or the party sought to be
charged thereunder.28 "For the purpose of showing that the plaintiff did not assent
or agree to the terms of the contract, extrinsic evidence is admissible, not to con-
tradict its express terms, but to show whether it was fairly and honestly entered
into.29
A like situation arises where two parties contemplate the making of a contract,
agree upon its terms, and even reduce it to writing, but condition its becoming
effective on the happening of a certain contingency. When sued upon such a writing,
one may, -by parol evidence, show that the contingency was not fulfilled and there-
fore no binding obligation ever came into being. In Vardeman v. Bris,3° the de-
25. Slaughter v. Sweet & Piper Mule Co., 259 S.W. 131 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924);
Slinkard v. Lamb Constr. Co., 212 S.W. 61 (St. L. Ct. App. 1919); McKim v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 196 Mo. App. 544, 196 S.W. 433 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917).
26. 80 Mo. App. 145 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899).
27. Warinner v. Nugent, 362 Mo. 233, 240 S.W.2d 941 (1951).
28. Pet Milk Co. v. Boland, 175 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1949); Thompson v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 59 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Mo. 1945); H. C. Lindsly & Son v.
Kansas City Viaduct & Terminal Co., 152 Mo. App. 221, 133 S.W. 189 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1911); McElvain v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 151 Mo. App. 126, 131 S.W. 736
(Spr. Ct. App. 1910).
29. McElvain v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., supra note 28, at 154, 131 S.W. at 746.
30. 199 S.W. 710 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917).
[Vol. 27
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fendant was sued for breach of a contract to use plaintiff's delivery service for his
Jefferson City business. He was allowed to introduce evidence that the contract
was not to become effective until his competitors had also agreed to subscribe to
the plaintiff's service, and that they had not so agreed. The court characterized
such evidence as not contradicting the writing, but rather ". . . the showing of a
separate agreement constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obli-
gation under the writing."31 Also, where complete and absolute delivery of a writ-
ing is essential to its validity, conditional delivery may be shown by paroL.2
Waiver of the condition precedent may be proven by parol too, since without a
waiver, there is no contract. 38
However, parol evidence may not be used to show a condition to one's per-
formance not stated in a binding contract. Evidence of such a condition was ex-
cluded in Marslall Hall Grain Co. v. P. H. Boyce Merchantile Co.,3 4 where an at-
tempt was made to show that delivery of corn sold under the contract was condi-
tioned on the seller's ability to procure freight cars.
While testimony to prove a parol condition precedent to a contract is allowed,
evidence of a condition subsequent to a contract not expressed therein is not:
[P]arol evidence is not admissible which, conceding the existence and
delivery of the contract obligation, and that it was at one time effective,
seeks to nullify, modify, or change the character of the obligation itself,
by showing that it is to cease to be effective or is to have an effect different
from that stated therein, upon certain conditions or contingencies, for this
does vary or contradict the terms of the writing.35
A somewhat specialized area is presented by negotiable instruments because
of extensive coverage by statute in Missouri. 6 Generally, it may be shown by parol
that a note or similar instrument, was conditionally delivered and never became
31. Id. at 711; Cf. Bommarito v. Southern Canning Co., 208 F.2d 56 (8th
Cir. 1953) (lease to be effective only upon being signed by all parties having an
interest in the premises); Elmer v. Flett, 297 S.W. 985 (Spr. Ct. App. 1927)_
(contract with attorney conditional on other heirs signing it); Tutt v. Price, 7
Mo. App. 194 (St. L. Ct. App. 1879) (release by creditors in a composition effec-
tive only on agreement of all creditors).
32. Pfeiffenberger v. Scott's Cleaners, 144 S.W.2d 183 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940)
(lease); Poplin v. Brown, 200 Mo. App. 255, 205 S.W. 411 (Spr. Ct. App. 1918)
(deed); Shantz v. Shriner, 167 Mo. App. 635, 150 S.W. 727 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912)
(mortgage).
33. Edwards v. Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 205 Mo. App. 102, 221 S.W. 422
(Spr. Ct. App. 1920); Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v. Providence-Washington Ins.
Co., 118 Mo. App. 85, 93 S.W. 358 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906); both involving waiver
of condition precedent to issuance of an insurance policy.
34. 203 Mo. App. 220, 211 S.W. 725 (Spr. Ct. App. 1919). See also Scullin
Steel Co. v. Mississippi Valley Iron Co., 308 Mo. 453, 273 S.W. 95 (1925) (en
banc); Neville v. Hughes, 104 Mo. App. 455, 79 S.W. 735 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904).
35. Farmers' State Bank v. Sloop, 200 S.W. 304, 305 (K.C. Ct. App. 1918).
For particular application to negotiable instruments see BRiTrON, BILLS AND) NoTEs
§ 55 (1943).
36. § 401.011, RSMo 1959, Presumptions as to date: § 401.014, RSMo 1959,
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binding in a suit between the original parties and their privies.3r In the leading
Missouri case of Earle v. Woodruff,8 the maker of the note was able to show that
the note was given on condition that a settlement of a pending law suit be made
in a certain way, and that it was in fact made another way. And, as between the
original parties to a note, an accommodation indorser may show by parol that the
proceeds of the note were to be used for a special purpose and were used for a
different purposeaD But extrinsic evidence that a note, absolute on its face, is
payable only on a contingency is inadmissable. 40 In Third Nat'l Bank v. Reichert,41
it was held that the maker of a note was not entitled to urge a parol agreement
that it was to be paid only in the event enough money was earned by a certain
milling corporation to pay the note from its profits.
Although a written contract exists, it may be void or voidable because of
fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence, or illegality in its inception. Parol evidence
is admissible to show that a contract is unenforceable for one of these reasons.
As a general rule in cases involving fraud, the parol evidence rule is not a bar
to its exposure. This is based on reasoning similar to that expressed by the court
in Richards v. Phoenix Mitt. Life Ins. Co.:42
[T~he vital additional element in fraud is the party's state of mind,
which neither can be nor is intended to be embodied in the written docu-
ment, and . . . hence the parol evidence rule does not forbid considering
it wherever it is the vital element of the claim. 3
A clear demonstration of this principle would allow extrinsic evidence in a
case where one, presented with what appears to be a petition for better govern-
ment, actually signs a note or mortgage concealed by an overlap of the papers.
However, most claims of fraud involve fraudulent misrepresentation rather than
fraud in the execution and present a much closer question on the admissiblity of
parol evidence.
37. J. B. Colt Co. v. Gregor, 328 Mo. 1216, 44 S.W.2d 2 (1931); Barrett
v. Davis, 104 Mo. 549, 16 S.W. 377 (1891); Bunch v. Phillips, 79 S.W.2d 785 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1935); Bank of Hollister v. O'Brien, 220 Mo. App. 1276, 290 S.W. 1009
(Spr. Ct. App. 1927); Slupsky v. Starr, 223 S.W. 816 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920);
Settles v. Moore, 149 Mo. App. 724, 129 S.W. 455 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910); Shelton
v. Durham, 7 Mo. App. 585 (St. L. Ct. App. 1879).
38. 274 S.W. 107 (Spr. Ct. App. 1925).
39. St. Louis Nat'l Bank v. Flanagan, 129 Mo. 178, 31 S.W. 773 (1895);
Mutual Life v. McKinnis, 47 S.W.2d 564 (Spr. Ct. App. 1932); Schlamp v.
Manewal, 196 Mo. App. 114, 190 S.W. 658 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916).
40. Smith v. Thomas, 29 Mo. 307 (1860); Jones v. Jeffries, 17 Mo. 577
(1853); F. M. Deuchler & Co. v. Hampton, 339 S.W.2d 499 (St. L. Ct. App.
1960); Bay v. Elmer, 237 S.W.2d 932 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951); In re Kenage's Estate,
3 S.W.2d 1041 (Spr. Ct. App. 1928); First Nat'l Bank v. Limpp, 221 Mo. App.
951, 288 S.W. 957 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926); First Natl Bank v. Henry, 202 S.W.
281 (ICC. Ct. App. 1918).
41. 101 Mo. App. 242, 73 S.W. 893 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903).
42. 215 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1954), which contains a survey of leading Missouri
cases involving fraud and the parol evidence rule. See also Gooch v. Conner,
8 Mo. 341 (1844).
43. Richards v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 42, at 116.
[Vol. 27
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1962], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss2/7
COMMENTS
Where the plaintiff seeks to enforce a contract he was induced to sign on the
basis of fraudulent misrepresentations, the problem arises whether the written
contract can be ignored in an action at law, and the parties' rights adjusted accord-
ing to the oral contract alone? Or must the written contract be first cancelled or
reformed by a court of equity? If the first alternative is chosen, then parol evi-
dence is permitted to change a written contract which is complete and not sug-
gestive of any omitted terms in outright violation of the parol evidence rule. On the
other hand, it seems unjust to allow the plaintiff to be cheated out of the bargain
he made because of the defendant's fraud in inducing him to sign a contract differ-
ing from the agreement made."- At least one Missouri decision has dealt with this
problem. In Koff man v. Soutkwest Mo. Elec. Ry.,45 the plaintiff was injured in a
street car collision and brought suit on an alleged agreement that the defendant
was to furnish a physician until such time as the plaintiff's broken leg was com-
pletely mended. The defendant produced a writing signed by the plaintiff in
which it agreed only to provide medical services until the plaintiff was able to get
home. The plaintiff contended that his signature was fraudulently obtained by
representations made to him that the writing contained their agreement when in
fact the defendant knew it did not. The court ruled in favor of the defendant:
It must be borne in mind, in considering this subject, that the common
law adheres more rigidly to the rule against varying or contradicting writ-
ten instruments by parol evidence than does equity. That rule was origi-
nally a part of common-law procedure, and not of equity; and exceptions
are admitted in equity practice that the law will not admit .... When the
suit is to be brought on the agreement as made, but not written, the writ-
ing must be rectified by a proceeding in equity.. .. 4
Other Missouri decisions are in accord with the statement of the Koffman case
and have been liberal in allowing plaintiffs to produce extrinsic evidence of fraudu-
lent misrepresentations in actions brought in equity for recission or other equitable
relief. 47 More common examples are recission based on misrepresentations concern-
44. TRAcY, EvMENCE 98 (1952).
45. 95 Mo. App. 459, 68 S.W. 212 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902).
46. Id. at 472, 68 S.W. at 216, 217. Cf. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Brown-
Crummler Inv. Co., 309 Mo. 638, 274 S.W. 815, 819 (1925) (en banc):
If a party defrauded misunderstands the nature of the contract so
that the minds of the parties never meet on its terms, it is void. But,
if understanding its terms, he is induced to sign it by fraudulent rep-
resentations outside of its terms, it is voidable and must be set aside before
the party defrauded can maintain an action upon it.
47. Frey v. Onstott, 357 Mo. 721, 210 S.W.2d 87 (1948); Johnson v. Dur-Est,
Inc., 224 S.W.2d 611 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949); Bixler v. Wagster, 256 S.W. 520 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1923) (misrepresentation as to quality of jewelry purchased); Mc-
Ternan v. Mason, 188 S.W. 923 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916); Shallcross Printing &
Stationery Co. v. Brown, 185 S.W. 745 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916) (representations on
the number of issues presold in which advertising was contracted for); Cook v.
Smith, 184 Mo. App. 561, 170 S.W. 672 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914); American Hardwood
Lumber Co. v. Dent, 121 Mo. App. 108, 98 S.W. 814 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906) (rep-
resentations as to grade of lumber); Elgin Jewelry Co. v. Withaup & Co., 118 Mo.
App. 126, 94 S.W. 572 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906); Stone v. Barrett, 34 Mo. App. 15
(K.C. Ct. App. 1889).
19621
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ing used cars,' 8 and the number of acres contained in a tract of land purchased by
plaintiff.49
This problem is avoided when a person who discovers he has been defrauded
rescinds the contract by returning whatever of value he has received and brings
an action in tort for damages.50 Parol evidence is then clearly admissible to prove
fraud, because the suit is not on the contract as reduced to writing, but is
grounded in tort.5 1 Thus in National Theater Supply v. Rigney,52 in a counterclaim
for damages, the defendant's testimony was admitted to prove false representations
that the air conditioning equipment purchased for his theater would lower the
temperature twenty degrees.
Where fraud is raised as a pure defense to an action brought against the party
allegedly defrauded, the theory must be, not that the parties actually had a verbal
agreement that differed from the written contract, but rather that the contract
itself constituted a fraud, or else that its execution by the defendant was procured
and induced by fraudulent representations regarding matters to which the con-
tract relates.5 3 These principles preclude the defense that the parties agreed the
defendant would not be liable on the note, or bound by the terms of the contract
be signed, regardless of the purpose for which it was otherwise signed.5 4 In other
48. Ruler v. M. & M. Motor Co., 231 S.W.2d 277 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950);
Clancy v. Reid-Ward Motor Co., 237 Mo. App. 1000, 170 S.W.2d 161 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1943) (mileage); Bunch v. Paxton, Duke & Bradley, 295 S.W. 474 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1927) (model); Tiffany v. Times Square Auto. Co., 168 Mo. App. 729, 154
S.W. 865 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913), where relief was allowed despite a recital in the
contract that no warranties or representations were contracted for other than those
stated in writing.
49. Rabenau v. Harrell, 278 Mo. 247, 213 S.W. 92 (1919); also McPherson v.
Kissee, 239 Mo. 664, 144 S.W. 410 (1912) (undisclosed indebtedness on land);
Burch v. Schmelig, 300 S.W.2d 838 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957). But cf. Dowd v. Lake
Sites, Inc., 365 Mo. 83, 276 S.W.2d 108 (1955), where the court refused to enjoin
defendants from violating the terms of an oral agreement concerning use of recrea-
tion facilities in a subdivision made to induce plaintiffs to purchase lots.
50. Parker v. Marquis, 164 Mo. 38 (1876); Whitlow v. Shortridge, 237 S.W.
834 (St. L. Ct. App. 1922); Harms v. Wolf, 114 Mo. App. 387, 89 S.W. 1037 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1905); Rhodes v. Dickerson, 95 Mo. App. 395, 69 S.W. 47 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1902).
51. Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312, 114 S.W. 979 (1908) (suit for damages in
fraudulent, material acreage discrepancy); Burns v. Vesto Co., 295 S.W.2d 576
(K.C. Ct. App. 1956) (used television set represented as new). Horwitz v. Schaper,
119 S.W.2d 474 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Kite v. Pittman, 278 S.W. 830 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1926) (acreage discrepancy); Newmeyer v. Williams, 205 Mo. App. 460, 225
S.W. 109 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920) (undisclosed mortgage); Morbrose Inv. Co. v.
Flick, 187 Mo. App. 528, 174 S.W. 188 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915) (fraudulent represen-
tations about used cars); Home v. John A. Hertel Co., 184 Mo. App. 725, 171 S.W.
598 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914) (employer's fraud in representations on product to be
sold by employee); Stratton v. Dudding, 164 Mo. App. 22, 147 S.W. 516 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1912); Wells v. Adams, 88 Mo. App. 215 (K.C. Ct. App. 1901).
52. 130 S.W.2d 258 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939).
53. Fishman-Harris Realty Co. v. Kleine, 82 S.W.2d 605 (St. L. Ct. App.
1935).
54. St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Fuhrmeister, 353 Mo. 232, 182 S.W.2d 273 (1944)(provision of a deed not to be enforced); F. M. Deuchler & Co. v. Hampton, .rupra
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words, breach of an oral, contemporaneous promise not to enforce the signed in-
strument does not constitute fraud.
Examples of successful defenses of fraud are Rice v. Lavmers55 and Conroy's
Inc. v. Brooks,56 where plaintiffs fraudulently induced defendants to purchase goods
by showing them a sample not representative of the goods delivered; and Metro-
politan Lead & Zinc Mining Co. v. Webster57 where plaintiffs used sham articles of
incorporation to induce defendants to sign stock subscriptions.
A common claim is that the plaintiff fraudulently represented the writing in
question to embody the agreement made, and in reliance, the defendant signed
without reading it. The early Missouri case of Wright v. McPike58 held that if one
procured the signature of another to a written contract, whether by fraud or not,
which did not contain the contract made, but a different one, he could not avail
himself on the written contract but must stand by the one made. However, this
liberal position was overruled in 1901 by Crim v. Crim,59 on the ground that such
a policy would allow anyone to avoid his legal obligations by claiming he did not
read the contract although he signed it, and thus greatly impair the value of all
contracts and negotiable instruments. The law in Missouri today is that falsely rep-
resenting to one in possession of his faculties and able to read, that a writing em-
bodies a verbal agreement is not such fraud as will allow him to avoid the con-
tract as reduced to writing, either in law or in equity.P° However, if the plaintiff
purports to read the contract in its entirety and purposely misreads it to in-
duce the defendant to sign, this is fraud that will excuse non-performance. 61 Also
note 40; Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Goessling, 121 S.W.2d 182 (St. L. Ct. App.
1938); Meyer v. Weber, 233 Mo. App. 832, 109 S.W.2d 702 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937);
England v. Houser, 178 Mo. App. 70, 163 S.W. 890 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914) (contract
to be for information purposes only); American Copying Co. v. Muleski, 138 Mo.
App. 419, 122 S.W. 384 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909) (part of printed form not to be in-
cluded in contract); New England Loan & Trust Co. v. Workman, 71 Mo. App. 275
(K.C. Ct. App. 1897).
55. 65 S.W.2d 151 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
56. 50 S.W.2d 708 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932).
57. 193 Mo. 351, 92 S.W. 79 (1906). For other cases in which the defense of
fraud was effective to save defendant from liability, see Oldham v. Siegfreid, 202
S.W.2d 132 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947); International Harvester Co. v. Jeffries, 4 S.W.2d
501 (Spr. Ct. App. 1928); Guess v. Russell Bros. Clothing Co., 231 S.W. 1015 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1921); Geo. 0. Richardson Mach. Co. v. Nelson, 191 Mo. App. 230, 177
S.W. 1082 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
58. 70 Mo. 175 (1879).
59. Supra note 5.
60. Dryssen v. Union Elec. L. & P. Co., 317 Mo. 221, 295 S.W. 116 (1927);
Hall v. Kansas City So. Ry., 209 S.W. 582 (K.C. Ct. App. 1919); Ely v. Sutton,
177 Mo. App. 546, 162 S.W. 755 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913); Paris Mfg. & Importing
Co. v. Carle, 116 Mo. App. 581, 92 S.W. 748 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906); Magee v.
Verity, 97 Mo. App. 486, 71 S.W. 472 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903); United Breeders v.
Wright, 134 Mo. App. 717, 115 S.W. 470 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909); Zellar v. Ranson,
140 Mo. App. 221, 123 S.W. 243 (Spr. Ct. App. 1909); Leicher v. Keeney, 98 Mo.
App. 394 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903); Johnston v. Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co., 93 Mo.
App. 580 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902); Catterlin v. Lusk, 98 Mo. App. 182, 71 S.W. 1109
(K.C. Ct. App. 1903).
61. Och v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 27, 31 S.W. 962 (1895); Birdsall v. Coon, 157
Mo. App. 439, 139 S.W. 243 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911); Carroll v. Peak, 156 Mo. App.
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if the defendant is unable to read, sick, intoxicated, or is otherwise justified in re-
lying on the defendant's representations as to the contents of the writing, his signa-
ture thereto will not bind him. 6 2
Many of the same considerations encountered in the preceding discussion of
fraud apply in the situation where a party to a binding contract seeks to show by
extrinsic evidence that because of mistake as to a material fact, the contract fails
to express the intentions of the parties. Here, as in the fraud situations, the strict
rule is that the obligee in a written contract which contains a mistake materially
affecting the rights of the parties must bring a suit in equity to recover upon it
to avoid violating the parol evidence rule. a At least where the mistake is one
merely of misdescription not prejudicial to either party, it may be pleaded in an
action at law and proven by parol.0 4 But if the effect of the mistake is more sub-
stantial the plaintiff will be forced into equity where parol evidence is more freely
admissible.05 Exemplary are several Missouri cases where the action was brought
to cancel a satisfaction and release recorded on a deed of trust by mistake. Such
entries were held open to explanation by parol evidence.66
Where a defendant seeks to prove a mistake by parol evidence as a defense to
an action, he may do so provided that facts showing the existence of the mistake
have been alleged in the pleadings.6 7 When mistake is pleaded in defense, the de-
fendant may introduce his evidence without asking for a reformation of the con-
tract.68 In Dickson v. Maddox,69 a suit was brought to set aside several deeds on
the ground that they had not been delivered. The defendant was allowed to intro-
duce testimony that a notation on each of them to the effect that they were sub-
446, 136 S.W. 961 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911); Tait v. Locke, 130 Mo. App. 273, 109
S.W. 105 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908); Broyles v. Absher, 107 Mo. App. 168, 80 S.W.
703 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904); Wells v. Adams, 88 Mo. App. 215 (K.C. Ct. App. 1901).
62. McGhee v. Bell, 170 Mo. 121, 70 S.W. 493 (1902) (en banc); Jackson v.
Merz, 223 S.W.2d 136 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Brisch,
154 Mo. App. 631, 136 S.W. 28 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911); Culp v. Powell, 68 Mo.
App. 238 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897).
63. Anton W. Luecke & Co. v. Cohen, 150 Mo. App. 48, 129 S.W. 1002 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1910); Bassett v. Glover, 31 Mo. App. 150 (St. L. Ct. App. 1888).
64. Continental Assur. Co. v. Van Cleve Bldg. & Constr. Co., 260 S.W.2d 319
St. L. Ct. App. 1953); McNeill v. Wabash Ry., 207 Mo. App. 161, 231 S.W. 649
St. L. Ct. App. 1921); Basset v. Glover, suspra note 63.
65. Miller v. Haberman, 359 Mo. 1012, 224 S.W.2d 1002 (1949); Em-
ployers' Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 38 S.W.2d 1049 (1931); Leitens-
dorfer v. Delphy, 15 Mo. 160 (1851); Sparks v. Brown, 46 Mo, App. 529 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1891).
66. State ex rel. Kilkenny v. Dawes, 289 S.W. 550 (Mo. 1926); Sells v. Tootle,
160 Mo. 593, 61 S.W. 579 (1901); Lanier v. McIntosh, 117 Mo. 508, 23 S.W. 787
(1893); cf. Moore v. Albright, 30 Mo. 249 (1860).1 67. Highland Inv. Co. v. Kansas City Computing Scales, Inc., 227 Mo. 363,
209 S.W. 895 (1919).
68. Gottfried v. Bray, 208 Mo. 652, 106 S.W. 639 (1907); Wood & Wood v.
Steamboat Fleetwood, 22 Mo. 560 (1856); Barlow v. Elliott, 56 Mo. App. 374 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1894); Short v. Thomas, 178 Mo. App. 400, 163 S.W. 252 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1914).
69. 330 Mo. 51, 48 S.W.2d 873 (1932).
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ject to recall by the grantor while in the hands of an escrow was due to the mis-
taken impression of the attorney who prepared them.
In all cases, the mistake must be one of fact, and material to allow evidence
thereof to impeach the contract.70
Forgery, alteration, erasure, and mutilation,71 as well as duress, undue in-
fluence72 and illegality"M are grounds for nullifying the legal effect of a written
instrument. Therefore, parol evidence of these factors may also be introduced for
the purpose of showing that no valid contract exists.
III. PAROL EVIDENCE is AyMrrrED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING THAT THE
PARTIES DID NOT ASSENT TO A PARTICULAR WRITING AS THE COMPLETE AND
AccURAT INTEGRATION OF THEM CoNTRAcr
The parol evidence rule does not operate in such a way as to force contracting
parties to reduce their entire agreement to writing. It may be that the writing
before the court is but part of a larger agreement which has not been reduced
to permanent form. Therefore, in addition to determining the existence of a con-
tract, the court must determine whether or not the writing before it is the com-
plete expression of that contract before the parol evidence rule becomes operative.
This is well stated by the court's reply to the defendant's invocation of the
rule in Warinner v. Nugent.74
The difficulty with respondent's argument is that it assumes the very
question presented by the evidence. The question is whether the only fair
and reasonable inference is that their entire oral agreement was inte-
grated. . . If not the respondent and the trial court misconceived and
misapplied the parol evidence rule. . . .As applied to contracts, the parol
evidence rule "assumes that there has been a legal act consisting of a
promise or set of promises; it also assumes the integration of that act in a
written memorial according to some standard which the law adopts; and
these assumptions being made, excludes from consideration all other
elements of the act though they might have been material had there been
no integration in a written memorial. . . .The parol evidence rule does
not apply to every contract of which there is written evidence, but only
70. Employers' Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, supra note 65.
71. Powell v. Banks, 146 Mo. 620, 48 S.W. 664 (1898); Medling v. Abraham
Lincoln Life Ins. Co., 225 Mo. App. 1243, 41 S.W.2d 6 (Spr. Ct. App. 1931) (also
holding that any erasure may be explained by the person charged with making it);
Murphy v. Holliway, 223 Mo. App. 714, 16 S.W.2d 107 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929);
Stringer v. Geiser Mfg. Co., 189 Mo. App. 337 (Spr. Ct. App. 1915) (evidence al-
lowed to show that blanks in a contract form had been filled in contrary to direc-
tions); Dove v. Fansler, 132 Mo. App. 669, 112 S.W. 1009 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
72. 32 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 981, 982 (1942).
73. Murray v. Murray, 293 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. 1956): "The rule which forbids
the introduction of parol evidence.., does not extend to evidence offered to show
that a contract was made in furtherance of objects forbidden by statute, by the
common law, or by the general policy of the law." Taylor v. Perkins, 171 Mo. App.
246, 157 S.W. 122 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913) (illegal consideration); Buckingham v.
Fitch, 18 Mo. App. 91 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885) (gambling contract).
74. 362 Mo. 233, 240 S.W.2d 941, 944 (1951).
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applies where the parties to an agreement reduce it to writing, and agree
or intend that the writing shall be their agreement. ' 75
Where only part of an agreement has been reduced to writing and signed in
connection with the performance of an oral contract, that part not reduced to
writing may be shown by parol. This is the doctrine of partial integration. The
doctrine is illustrated in Kennedy v. Bowling,76 an action for faulty construction
where the specifications were not made part of the building contract; in Good-
speed v. Grand Natl Bank,77 an action for interest where the passbook did not
constitute the entire deposit agreement; and in Iowa-Missouri Walnut Co. v.
Gra2,7T where the only writing evidencing the contract was an instrument which
purported to be a check in payment of the contractual obligation.
It is obvious that integration or partial integration of an agreement is de-
pendent on the intentions of the parties, which are often not clearly ascertainable7 9
Furthermore, where parties put their engagement in writing in such terms as import
a legal obligation, there is a conclusive presumption in Missouri that the entire
agreement was expressed in writing.80 Therefore it has become settled law that
parol evidence of a larger oral agreement is inadmissible unless that part of the
contract which is reduced to writing shows upon its face that it is incomplete
and does not purport to be a complete expression of the entire contract.8' Evidence
that is admitted must not add to the obligations or interfere with the terms that
are written.82 No additional terms may be enforced if the contract is one required
to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds. 3
75. Id. at 238, 240 S.W.2d at 944.
76. 319 Mo. 401, 4 S.W.2d 438 (1928); Bernhardt v. Boeuf & Berger Mut. Ins.
Co., 319 S.W.2d 673 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959); Francis v. Saleeby, 282 S.W.2d 167
(St. L. Ct. App. 1955); Bowers v. Bell, 193 Mo. App. 210, 182 S.W. 1068 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1916).
77. 46 S.W.2d 913 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932); In re Liquidation of Fid. Bank
& Trust Co., 77 S.W.2d 480 (St. L. Ct. App. 1934); cf. Brigance v. Bank of
Cooter, 200 S.W. 668 (Spr. Ct. App. 1918); and Quattrochi Bros. v. Farmers &
Merchants Bank, 89 Mo. App. 500 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901), holding that an entry
in a passbook is a receipt open to explanation by parol evidence.
78. 237 Mo. App. 1093, 170 S.W.2d 437 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943).
79. See Hargis v. Sample, 306 S.W.2d 564, 572 (Mo. 1957), where a schedule
of repairs alleged to be attached to a lease when signed was held admissible although
defendant denied having ever seen it: "Those matters went to the weight of plain-
tiff's testimony with respect to the lease and not to the admissibility of the exhibit."
80. Tracy v. Union Iron Works, 104 Mo. 193, 16 S.W. 203 (1891).
81. Fox Midwest Theaters v. Means, 221 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1955); Koons v.
St. Louis Car Co., 203 Mo. 227, 101 S.W. 49 (1907); Davis v. Scovern, 130 Mo.
303, 32 S.W. 986 (1895); Grapette Co. v. Grapette Bottling Co., 286 S.W.2d 34
(Spr. Ct. App. 1956); Edwards v. Sittner, 213 S.W.2d 652 (Spr. Ct. App. 1948);
Shuffner v. Moore Shoe Co., 35 S.W.2d 935 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941).
82. Mitchell v. Philippi, 359 Mo. 754, 223 S.W.2d 441 (1949); Koons v. St.
Louis Car Co., supra note 81; Bittner v. Crown Shoe Mfg. Co., 340 S.W.2d 142(St. L. Ct. App. 1960); Nickerson v. Whalen, 253 S.W.2d 502 (K.C. Ct. App.
1952).
83. Fisher v. Miceli, 291 S.W.2d 845 (Mo. 1956); Warren v. A. B. Mayer Mfg.
Co., 161 Mo. 112, 61 S.W. 644 (1901); McWilliams v. Drainage Dist. No. 19, 204
Mo. App. 237, 224 S.W. 35 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
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The foregoing principles are well illustrated in cases where oral warranties
and guaranties aliunde the written instrument are urged. If the writing evidencing
a sale appears to cover completely the sale agreement, the court is likely to
adopt the sentiment expressed in Sunderland v. Hackney Mfg. Co.:s4 "To allow
parol evidence of a verbal warranty when the writing is silent would be to add
a distinct provision to the contract." But if the writing evidencing the sale is a
mere receipt or memorandum, the alleged warranty stands on the same ground
as any other provision of a contract not completely reduced to writings 5
Closely related to the doctrine of partial integration, another application of
the parol evidence rule permits proof of the existence of an oral agreement collateral
to and executed simultaneously with a written instrument, which collateral agree-
ment covers a material matter agreed to by the parties distinct from, but closely
related to the express subject matter of the written instrument and not embodied
therein.8s
The test to determine if an agreement is collateral as stated by Professor
Williston is: Would a reasonable person making such agreements as are set out
both in the writing and in the proffered parol evidence have naturally separated
the matter into two parts?sr He further suggests that as a practical matter
collateralness will depend on whether or not the subject matter of the parol
agreement is mentioned at all in the writing.88 Missouri courts have been more
lenient in enforcing a collateral agreement where it appears that it was entered
into as an inducement to sign the written contract.89 But under either test set
forth above, the collateral agreement is subject to the criteria set forth in Crossnan
v. Noll:90
The verbal collateral agreement must be independent and distinct from
the written agreement, and must not be inconsistent with it. And it must
84. 192 Mo. App. 287, 181 S.W. 1192, 1194 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915); Little v.
Widener, 226 Mo. App. 225, 32 S.W.2d 116 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930); cf. Crossnan v.
Noll, 120 S.W.2d 189 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938) (contract specified no warranties).
85. St. Louis Auto Parts & Salvage Co. v. Indiana Auto Salvage Co., 89
S.W.2d 134 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936); Boulware v. Victor Auto. Mfg. Co., 152 Mo.
App. 567, 134 S.W. 7 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
86. Brown v. Bowen, 90 Mo. 184 (1886); Whaley v. Milton Constr. Co., 241
S.W.2d 23 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951) (oral building contract distinct from written
earnest money contract); Roberts v. Robberson, 215 S.W.2d 767 (Spr. Ct. App.
1948) (sales contract not inconsistent with oral commission agreement); Feldman
v. Goldman, 164 S.W.2d 634 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942) (written exchange contract
and oral commission agreement); Hart v. Riedel, 51 S.W.2d 891 (St. L. Ct. App.
1932) (parol contract to furnish power line not covered by deed); Scott v. Asbury,
198 S.W. 1131 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917) (oral contract not to compete separate from
written sale of property); Corn v. McDowell, 185 S.W. 235 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916)
(deed and oral contract to make improvements).
87. 3 WILLISTON, CoNTIAcTs § 639 (rev. ed. 1936).
88. Id.
89. Charles A. Liemke Co. v. Krekeler Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 169, 95
S.W.2d 820 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936); Owsley v. Jackson, 163 Mo. App. 11, 144
S.W. 154 (Spr. Ct. App. 1912).
90. 120 S.W.2d 189 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Limpp, 221 Mo. App. 951, 288 S.W. 957 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926).
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not be so closely cdnnected with the transaction as to form a part of
it. Therefore whatever is embraced in the writing cannot be nullified,
qualified, or added to by the collateral agreement.91
The parol evidence rule does not preclude the showing of a subsequent oral
agreement which alters or abrogates a written contract. It makes no difference
how soon after the execution of the written contract that the parol one was made,
if, in fact it was subsequent and not otherwise objectionable.9 2
IV. PAROL EVIDENCE IS ADMITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AIDING IN THE
CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE
WRITrTEN INSTRUMENT
When it is established that a contract exists, and that there are no grounds
for nullifying its legal effect, e.g., fraud or duress, there is still a broad area in
which parol evidence is allowed in actions involving that contract. That is the
area where a written contract is not entirely clear and definite in its meaning and
purport; where its terms are susceptible of more than one interpretation so that
reasonable men might differ in its construction. Parol evidence is then admissible
to aid in arriving at the intentions of the parties and to resolve ambiguities re-
sulting from their use of equivocal language. 93
Extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of written contracts is ordinarily
proper only after the court has ascertained the existence of an ambiguity, and
then only for the limited purpose of explaining the ambiguity. 4 Furthermore,
the court cannot, with or without parol evidence, make a contract for the parties
where they have failed to express one in their written instrument. Hence a long-
recognized distinction has been drawn between latent and patent ambiguities.
Patent ambiguities are such as appear from reading the instrument without any
attempt to apply it, i.e., conflicting provisions. These ambiguities must be resolved
by applying legal principles of construction and no resort may be had to evidence
of what the parties meant or intended. 5 If the ambiguity cannot be thus resolved,
the contract fails for uncertainty and is void.9 6 Such was the result in Romine v.
91. Crossnan v. Noll, supra note 90, at 191.
92. Ragan v. Schreffler, 306 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1957); George F. Robertson
Plastering Co. v. Magidson, 271 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1954); Bunce v. Beck, 43 Mo.
266 (1869); A. B. Collins Co. v. Quentin, 71 S.W.2d 758 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934);
Wharton v. Missouri Car Foundry Co., 1 Mo. App. 577 (St. L. Ct. App. 1876).
93. Fisher v. Miceli, supra note 83; Interior Linseed Co. v. Becker-Moore
Paint Co., 273 Mo. 433, 202 S.W. 566 (1918); Citizens' Trust Co. v. Tinde, 272 Mo.
681, 199 S.W. 1025 (1917); Hellrung v. Viviano, 7 S.W.2d 288 (St. L. Ct. App.
1928); Ebbs v. Neff, 220 Mo. App. 1070, 282 S.W. 74 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926).
94. Walters v. Tucker, 281 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1955); Kalen v. Steele, 341
S.W.2d 343 (K.C. Ct. App. 1960); Prestigiacomo v. American Equitable Assur.
Co., 221 S.W.2d 217 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949); Murphy v. Holliway, 223 Mo. App.
714, 16 S.W.2d 107 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929).
95. Jamison v. Wells, 7 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1928); Graham v. Gardner, 233
S.W.2d 797 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
96. Campbell v. Johnson, 44 Mo. 247 (1869); McCormick v. Parsons, 195
Mo. 91, 92 S.W. 1162 (1906); Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo. 122 (1866).
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Haag, 7 where the description in a mortgage held void read in part: "The southeast
quarter of the southwest quarter of section twenty (25) in township... "
A latent ambiguity exists where a writing presents no ambiguity on its face,
but when it is sought to apply the words used to the subject matter, it is found
that they do not correctly describe or clearly apply to itY9 In such a case the
ambiguity does not come out of the four comers of the writing and parol evidence
is admissible to clear it up, as in the case of Kast v. Kast.99 There, a clause in a
property settlement gave the wife seventy-five shares of stock. When the stock
split four for one, after execution of the settlement but prior to distribution, parol
evidence was allowed to show that the parties had agreed that the wife was to
receive one-half of all the husband's assets.
One notable relaxation of this distinction is where the party executing the
instrument is dead. Whether the ambiguity is latent or patent, parol evidence is
received by the court in its quest for all information possible with which to
interpret the decedent's intentions.100
Parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose of attempting to create an
ambiguity in a contract which upon its face is capable of being a definite and
certain legal meaning.11
Parol evidence will be received to explain ambiguous, obscure, or technical
words.202 Where a written instrument contains words or expressions of a technical
nature connected with some art, science, or occupation unintelligible to the common
reader, but susceptible of definite interpretation by experts, parol evidence is
admissible to explain the terms used. The case of Ragsdale v. Tomboy, Inc.,
°10
97. 178 S.W. 147 (Mo. 1915).
98. Prestigiacomo v. American Equitable Assur. Co., supra note 94.
99. 361 Mo. 623, 235 S.W.2d 375 (1951); Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Theiss, 342 Mo. 40, 111 S.W.2d 189 (1937); Meinhardt v. White, 341 Mo. 446, 107
S.W.2d 1061 (1937); State ex rel. W. L. Morrison Inv. Co. v. Trimble, 301 Mo.
146, 256 S.W. 171 (1923) (en banc).
100. Bond v. Riley, 317 Mo. 594, 296 S.W. 401 (1927); Mockbee v. Grooms,
300 Mo. 446, 234 S.W. 170 (1923); Briant v. Garrison, 150 Mo. 655, 52 S.W. 361
(1899); Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670 (1877); Sims v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.,
223 Mo. App. 1150, 23 S.W.2d 1075 (St. L. Ct App. 1930); In re Aikens Estate, 5
S.W.2d 662 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928).
101. National Surety Corp. v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 268 F.2d 525
(8th Cir. 1959).
102. Moran Bolt & Nut Co. v. St. Louis Car Co., 210 Mo. 715, 109 S.W. 47
(1908); Hellrung v. Viviano, supra note 93.
103. 317 S.W.2d 679 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958); Ruysser v. Smith, 293 S.W.2d
930 (Mo. 1956) ("indemnity"); Paisley v. Lucas, 346 Mo. 827, 143 S.W.2d 262
(1940) ("exclusive"); National Bank of Commerce v. Flanagan Mills & Elevator
Co., 268 Mo. 547, 188 S.W. 117 (1916) (en banc) ("receipts"); Finnegan v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 261 Mo. 504, 169 S.W. 969 (1914) ("full control"); Friedman
Textile Co. v. Northland Shopping Center, 321 S.W.2d 9 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959)
("children's store"); Davison v. Rodes, 299 S.W.2d 591 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956) ("re-
lease"); Wentzel v. Lake Lotawana Developing Co., 226 Mo. App. 960, 48 S.W.2d
185 (K.C. Ct. App. 1932) ("clearing"); Hellrung v. Viviano, supra note 93 ("street
made"); Wisconsin & Ark. Lumber Co. v. Baschow, 257 S.W. 840 (K.C. Ct. App.
19621
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is typical of this situation, involving a contract under which compensation was to
be the "net profits" of a certain department and a dispute arose over the precise
meaning of that term.
If the writing itself is illegible and thus obscurely expressed, evidence may
be heard pertaining to the relation of the parties, their antecedent acts and the
subject matter.10 '
Particularly in cases involving insurance policies, parol evidence has been
resorted to in order to determine who the parties to the contract are, when those
intended to be parties are not named.10 5 A related problem arises where it is
doubtful from the face of a note whether it was intended as the personal contract
of the individual signing it, or as imposing the obligation solely on a third party
as principal.108
Similarly, where difficulty is experienced in identifying the subject matter of
the agreement, parol evidence is admissible, not to vary or contradict its terms,
but for the purpose of explaining them. The most common type of case in Missouri
in this respect has involved boundary calls in deeds. 0 7 However, parol evidence
cannot be introduced to strike down the operative words of a deed.108
In other cases it may be necessary to resort to parol evidence of the intent
of the parties as to the subject matter in order to construe accurately the con-
tract. 100 Thus, in Ambassador Bldg. Corp. v. St. Louis Ambassador Thleater,z""
an action involving an extremely complicated lease, the court said:
For the purpose of determining the intention of the parties and reaching
a construction that is fair and reasonable under all the facts and cir-
1924); Lasar Mfg. Co. v. Peligreen Constr. & Inv. Co., 179 Mo. App. 447, 162 S.W.
691 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913) ("furring"); But cf. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n
v. Hobbs, 186 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1951).
104. Black River Lumber Co. v. Warner, 93 Mo. 374, 6 S.W. 210 (1887); Ed-
wards v. Smith, 63 Mo. 119 (1876); Smith v. Van Wyck, 40 Mo. App. 522 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1890); Heideman v. Wolfstein, 12 Mo. App. 366 (St. L. Ct. App. 1882).
105. Platho v. Merchants & Mfgrs. Ins. Co., 38 Mo. 248 (1866); Wise v. St.
Louis Marine Ins. Co., 23 Mo. 80 (1856); Cotton v. Iowa Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 260
S.W.2d 43 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953); Estes v. Great American Ins. Co., 112 S.W.2d
153 (Spr. Ct. App. 1938); Becker v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 99 S.W.2d 148
(St. L. Ct. App. 1936); Newbill v. Union Indem. Co., 60 S.W.2d 658 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1933).
106. Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531, 15 S.W. 417 (1891); Finch
v. Heeb, 107 S.W.2d 962 (Spr. Ct. App. 1937); Meyers v. Chesly, 177 S.W. 326(Spr. Ct. App. 1915); Markham v. Cover, 99 Mo. App. 83 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903).
107. City of Warsaw v. Swearngin, 295 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. 1956); Stith v. Post,
232 S.W. 985 (Mo. 1921); Kleine v. Kleine, 281 Mo. 317, 219 S.W. 610 (1920);
Hubbard v. Whitehead, 221 Mo. 672, 121 S.W. 69 (1909); Hammon v. Johnston, 93
Mo. 198, 6 S.W. 83 (1887); Worthington Drainage Dist. v. Davis, 235 Mo. App. 949,
151 S.W.2d 469 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941).
108. Willoughby v. Brandes, 317 Mo. 544, 297 S.W. 54 (1927); Weisenfels v.
Cable, 208 Mo. 515, 106 S.W. 1028 (1907); Owen v. Ellis, 64 Mo. 77 (1876).
109. Wilcox v. Coons, 362 Mo. 381, 241 S.W.2d 907 (1951); Paisley v. Lucas,
supra note 103; Tuohy v. Novich, 230 S.W.2d 152 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950); Baptiste
Tent & Awning Co. v. Uhri, 129 S.W.2d 9 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939); Home Trust Co.
v. Shapiro, 228 Mo. App. 266, 64 S.W.2d 717 (K.C. Ct. App. 1933).
110. 238 Mo. App. 600, 185 S.W.2d 827 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
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cumstances, the court may consider the relationship of the parties, the
subject matter of the contract, the usages of the business, the surround-
ing facts and circumstances attending the execution of the contract and
its interpretation by the parties.11
But where the intention of the parties is clearly expressed in an unambiguous
instrument, the admission of parol evidence to prove a different intention is
improper.12
The rule is now firmly established that when a statement of consideration
in a contract is merely formal, it may be contradicted or explained by parol
evidence.313 In such cases the consideration clause is not deemed an essential
part of the instrument. Rather it is regarded as a mere recital, or receipt and
as such may be explained."14 However, if the statement of consideration is more
than a recital, and is an integral part of the contract, it is not open to contradiction
under the immunity from parol attack afforded written contracts.115 The most
common example of a formal statement of consideration is found in the ordinary
deed, where such a recital as "one dollar and other valuable consideration" is open
to elucidation in a legal actionYl6
Between the original parties to a note, the obligor may introduce evidence
of a failure of consideration.117 But when the rights of a third party become in-
volved, such evidence may not be brought before the court.""
111. Id. at 617, 185 S.W. at 837.
112. McLean Constr. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 168 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo.
1958); Krug v. Bremer, 316 Mo. 891, 292 S.W. 702 (1927); Kalen v. Steele, 341
S.W.2d 343 (K.C. Ct. App. 1960); National Cylinder Gas Co. v. G. H. Packwood
Mfg. Co., 208 S.W.2d 825 (St. L. Ct. App. 1948).
113. Ragan v. Schreffler, suzpra note 92; Craig v. Koss Constr. Co., 69 S.W.2d
964 (Spr. Ct. App. 1934); Wolfinbarger v. Metcalf, 282 S.W. 749 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1926); Eastin v. Bank of Harrisonville, 213 Mo. App. 130, 246 S.W. 991 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1923); Boswell v. Richards, 224 S.W. 1031 (Spr. Ct. App. 1920).
114. Meyer v. Weber, 233 Mo. App. 832, 109 S.W.2d 702 (St. L. Ct. App.
1937); Crocker v. MacCartney, 24 S.W.2d 649 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930); Dove v.
Fansler, supra note 71; Dawson v. Wombles, 111 Mo. App. 532, 86 S.W. 271 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1905).
115. State ex rel. Alpert v. Boyle-Pryor Constr. Co., 352 Mo. 1061, 180 S.W.2d
727 (1944); Burk v. Walton, 337 Mo. 781, 86 S.W.2d 92 (1935); J. B. Colt Co. v.
Gregor, 328 Mo. 1216, 44 S.W.2d 2 (1931); Ezo v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co.,
87 S.W.2d 1051 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936); Bert v. Rhodes, 258 S.W. 40 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1924); General Acc. Fire & Life Ins. Co. v. Owen Bldg. Co., 195 Mo. App.
371, 192 S.W. 145 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917); Pile v. Bright, 156 Mo. App. 301, 137
S.W. 1017 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
116. Allaben v. Shelbourne, 357 Mo. 1205, 212 S.W.2d 719 (1948); Frey v.
Onstott, 357 Mo. 721, 210 S.W.2d 87 (1948); Robinson v. Field, 342 Mo. 778, 117
S.W.2d 308 (1938); Finley v. Williams, 325 Mo. 688, 29 S.W.2d 103 (1930); Ed-
wards v. Latimer, 18 Mo. 610, 82 S.W. 109 (1904); Pickett v. Town of Mercer,
106 Mo. App. 689, 80 S.W. 285 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904).
117. Dickherber v. Turnbull, 31 S.W.2d 234 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930); Stumbaugh
v. Hall, 30 S.W.2d 160 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930); Main St. Bank v. Ennis, 222 Mo. App.
915, 7 S.W.2d 391 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928); In re Kenage's Estate, 3 S.W.2d 1041 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1928); Farmers' Bank v. Harris, 250 S.W. 946 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923);
George 0. Richardson Mach. Co. v. Dix, 245 S.W. 215 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).
118. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Limpp, supra note 90.
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CONCLUSION
The parol evidence rule in Missouri remains one of the cornerstones of com-
mercial law, preserving the sanctity of -all writings whose terms import a legal
obligation. It is not probable that the rule or its applications will change appre-
ciably in the future. On the contrary, as new types of written transactions are
developed, the parol evidence rule will continue to preserve and protect the obliga-
tions thereby created.
It is possible that the rule will -become part of the statutory law of Missouri.
The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been under consideration by the
Missouri General Assembly, contains a statement of the parol evidence rule
which does not differ in substance from that now used by Missouri courts.11 9
LYLE H. PETr=
119. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the par-
ties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms
as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of
performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive state-
ment of the terms of the agreement.
One previous attempt has been made to codify the rule. The 1948 Proposed
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